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DSGE modelingIn the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis, it has been argued that a guideline for the design of the
futurepolicy framework shouldbe to take the ‘a’ out of ‘asymmetry’ in thewaymonetary pol-
icy deals with asset pricemovements. Recent empirical evidence has suggested that the Fed-
eral Reserve may have followed an asymmetric policy towards the stock market in the pre-
crisis period. According to these ﬁndings,monetary policy in theUS before the crisis involved
a reaction to stock price drops, but no reaction to increasing stock prices. The present paper
studies the effects of such apolicy in aDSGEmodel. The asymmetric policy rule introduces an
important non-linearity into the model: Booms in output and inﬂation tend to be ampliﬁed,
while recessions are dampened. Moreover, such a policy gives rise to expectations-driven
booms in asset prices.We further investigate towhat extent an asymmetric stock price reac-
tion could bemotivated by the desire of policymakers to correct for inherent asymmetries in
the way stock price movements affect the macroeconomy.
 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
While the recent ﬁnancial and economic crisis does not invalidate everything we have learned about macroeconomics
since 1936, as Barro (2009) eloquently puts it, it has led economists to reconsider some ideas that once were considered
common sense. As one example, the crisis has led to a revival of the debate about the role of asset prices in monetary policy;
see Kuttner (2011) for an overview. Despite some enduring disagreement, a certain degree of consensus had been reached
before the crisis, according to which central banks should not lean against asset price movements. The reason for this was
not only that ‘bubbles’ in asset prices may be extremely hard to identify in real time, but also that even in the face of ‘normal’
ﬂuctuations in asset prices, the interest rate tool may be too blunt and have unpleasant side effects. Instead, monetary pol-
icymakers should stand ready to cut the interest rate in response to plummeting asset prices.1 The aftermath of the crisis has
witnessed an emerging appreciation and critique of an inherent asymmetry in this approach to monetary policy (e.g. White,
2009; Mishkin, 2010; Issing, 2011). In the words of Stark (2011), the consensus implied that ‘monetary policy should react to asset
price busts; not to asset price booms’. Issing (2011) points to the risk that such a policy might lead to moral hazard problems by
covering part of the downside risk faced by investors in the stock market.
Some recent studies lend empirical support to the existence of an asymmetric monetary policy towards the stock market
in the US before the crisis. Ravn (2012) ﬁnds that during the period 1998–2008, a 5% drop in the S&P 500 index increased theMacro-
2 S.H. Ravn / Journal of Macroeconomics xxx (2013) xxx–xxxprobability of a subsequent 25 basis point interest rate cut by between 1/3 and 1/2, depending on the estimation method. On
the other hand, he ﬁnds no signiﬁcant policy reaction to stock price increases. Similarly, Hoffmann (2013) reports that for the
longer period 1987–2008, the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates in response to stock market drops, but did not raise
rates when stock prices boomed. For the same sample period, Hall (2011) ﬁnds that stock price deﬂation led to a highly sig-
niﬁcant cut in the interest rate, and that the inclusion of stock price deﬂation improves the ﬁt of an estimated Taylor rule.
In this paper, we contribute to the recent debate by examining the effects of an asymmetric monetary policy in general
equilibrium. We build a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model in which asset prices play an important role
via the ﬁnancial accelerator of Bernanke et al. (1999). We then allow the central bank to follow a monetary policy rule with
an asymmetric reaction to stock prices. This introduces an important discontinuity into the model that cannot be ‘log-line-
arized away’. As a result, it is not possible to solve the model using standard techniques. Instead, we apply a numerical solu-
tion method which exploits the piecewise linearity of the model. Essentially, the model consists of two linearized systems
around the same steady state; one system for when stock prices are increasing (or constant), and another for when they are
decreasing. We construct a ‘shooting’ algorithm to detect the switching points between these systems in order to solve the
model. In this sense, we make a methodological contribution to the sparse literature on endogenous regime switching in
monetary policy initiated by Davig and Leeper (2006). The solution method is similar to the one used by Bodenstein et al.
(2009) to deal with the zero lower bound on interest rates, which in turn builds on work by Eggertson and Woodford
(2003) and Christiano (2004).
The analysis uncovers some interesting implications of the asymmetric policy. By reacting only to stock price drops, the
central bank induces an outcome where booms in output and inﬂation are ampliﬁed, while recessions are dampened. In
other words, the asymmetric policy translates into an asymmetric business cycle. We brieﬂy relate this ﬁnding to the exist-
ing literature on asymmetric business cycles. In addition, the asymmetric policy gives rise to what we call an anticipation
boom in asset prices. In the wake of an expansionary shock, the asset price jumps up. It turns out that this jump is larger
than in a model with no reaction to stock price changes, despite the fact that in both cases, the actual policy reaction to stock
prices is zero during the asset price boom. The anticipation boom, which measures the additional rise in asset prices when
the asymmetric policy is introduced, can be attributed to forward-looking agents anticipating that whenever stock prices
start falling, the central bank will cut the interest rate. This implicit, partial insurance against asset price drops ampliﬁes
the rise in asset prices immediately after the shock. If the asymmetric policy reaction to stock prices is of the magnitude
found in the recent empirical studies, these effects are quantitatively quite small. In the literature, an important divergence
exists between the magnitude of the reaction to asset prices found in empirical studies, which is often quite small, and the
values used in theoretical investigations, which are usually a lot larger. To bridge this gap, we therefore also employ a value
of the reaction parameter which is more in accordance with the values in other theoretical contributions. When this is done,
the above effects are sizeable. In general, we conclude that while an asymmetric policy has the theoretical potential to gen-
erate severely skewed business cycles and important additional asset price volatility, the asymmetric reactions found in re-
cent empirical studies are too small to have had quantitatively important macroeconomic effects.
We also discuss potential motivations for an asymmetric monetary policy. One such motivation could be an asymmet-
ric loss function of the central bank, as previously studied in the literature. Another potential explanation is that such a
policy could be an attempt by the central bank to ‘correct for’ other asymmetries in the economy, in particular in the way
stock prices inﬂuence the macroeconomy. We therefore evaluate how an asymmetric monetary policy interacts with
other potential asymmetries, such as the ﬁnancial accelerator of Bernanke et al. (1999) and the stock wealth effect on
consumption. We demonstrate that if the ﬁnancial accelerator is assumed to be stronger when net worth of ﬁrms is
low, as has been suggested by several authors, the asymmetric policy is able to ‘cancel out’ this asymmetry in the case
of supply shocks, but not after demand shocks. A similar conclusion is reached under the assumption of asymmetric
wealth effects.
The debate about the role of asset prices in monetary policy goes back at least to Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), who
argue that monetary policy should not react to asset prices per se. This view has received support from Gilchrist and Leahy
(2002) and Tetlow (2005), as well as in speeches by leading Federal Reserve ofﬁcials (Kohn, 2006; Mishkin, 2008). In contrast,
Cecchetti et al. (2000) ﬁnd that the optimal monetary policy rule does include a reaction to the stock market. Bordo and
Jeanne (2002) and Borio and White (2003) arrive at the same conclusion.
While most of these ﬁrst contributions to this debate assumed the presence of a ‘bubble’ term in the asset price, more
recent studies have focused on monetary policy reactions to fundamental movements in asset prices. Faia and Monacelli
(2007) ﬁnd that there is no additional welfare gain from reacting to asset prices on top of what may be obtained through
a strong reaction to inﬂation. Leduc and Natal (2011) arrive at the opposite result, and explain how this difference is related
to the assumption of Faia and Monacelli (2007) that policymakers are able to compensate workers in a lump-summanner for
the distortion arising from monopolistic competition, thereby making the ﬂexible-price equilibrium efﬁcient. Gilchrist and
Saito (2008) assume that private agents and policymakers learn about the underlying trend growth in productivity over time.
In their setup, the desirability of a policy reaction to asset prices depends on the information structure of the economy. In the
present paper, we follow this recent tradition and abstract from asset price ‘bubbles’.22 Another common feature of these studies is the crucial role played by ﬁnancial frictions, which we also include in our model as described in the next
section.
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the dynamics of the model and the implications of introducing an asymmetric reaction to stock prices. In Section 4, we dis-
cuss possible explanations for the asymmetric policy within the model framework. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains
details about the model and the solution method.3
2. The model
The general equilibrium model is a version of the standard New-Keynesian sticky-price model with capital. We augment
the model with the ﬁnancial accelerator of Bernanke et al. (1999). This mechanism is one of the most widespread ways of
incorporating ﬁnancial frictions into general equilibrium models, as it captures one of the most important channels through
which asset prices affect the macroeconomy on the ﬁrm side. In particular, it is a common feature in most of the studies of
the role of asset prices in monetary policy cited above, and therefore makes for straightforward comparisons with the exist-
ing literature.4 While it would be possible to study a monetary policy reaction to asset prices without the ﬁnancial accelerator
(or a similar mechanism), such a model would be tilted towards ﬁnding very small effects of such a reaction.
An additional feature is that contracts are written in terms of the nominal interest rate as in Christensen and Dib (2008),
introducing the debt-deﬂation channel of Fisher (1933). Christiano et al. (2010) ﬁnd that this channel is empirically relevant.
The model is in large part similar to that of Christensen and Dib (2008) or Gilchrist and Saito (2008). This has the advantage
that the dynamics of this class of models are well described in the literature, allowing us to isolate the effects of the asym-
metric monetary policy rule. Moreover, this allows us to calibrate the model using the parameter values estimated by Chris-
tensen and Dib for the US economy for most of the parameters. The stochastic part of the model is quite parsimonious, as
only two shocks are included: a technology shock and a monetary policy shock. These two shocks, which can loosely be
interpreted as a supply and a demand shock, are sufﬁcient to highlight the effects of the asymmetric policy.
2.1. Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs produce the intermediate goods that the ﬁnal goods producers take as input. Each entrepreneur employs
labor Ht and capital Kt , and produces output Yt according to the following production technology:3 In a
4 One
howeve
Bernank
5 In c
6 In t
Please
econoYt ¼ ðAtHtÞ1aKat : ð1Þ
The technology level At evolves according tolnðAtÞ  ð1 qaÞAþ qa lnðAt1Þ þ eat ; ð2Þ
where eat is a normally distributed shock to technology with mean zero. In each period, entrepreneurs face a constant prob-
ability 1 mð Þ of leaving the economy. As described by Bernanke et al. (1999), this assumption is made in order to ensure that
entrepreneurs do not eventually accumulate enough capital to be able to ﬁnance their own activities entirely. To ensure that
new entrepreneurs start out with non-zero net worth, we follow Christensen and Dib (2008) and allow newly entering ﬁrms
to inherit a portion of the net worth of those ﬁrms who exit the economy.5
Entrepreneurs choose the inputs of capital and labor to maximize their proﬁts, subject to the production technology.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are shown in the online Appendix. Each entrepreneur can obtain the capital needed for produc-
tion in two ways: He can issue equity shares (internal ﬁnancing), or he can borrow the money from a ﬁnancial interme-
diary (external ﬁnancing). Because internal ﬁnancing is cheaper, as discussed below, entrepreneurs use all of their net
worth, and borrow the remainder of their funding needs from the ﬁnancial intermediary. The total funding needed by
an entrepreneur is qtKtþ1, where qt is the real price of capital as measured in units of consumption. In order to ensure that
any ﬁnancial constraint faced by the entrepreneur applies to the capital stock as such, and not just to the investment in
any given period, we assume that the entrepreneur must reﬁnance his entire capital stock each period. If nt denotes the
net worth of the entrepreneur, the amount he needs to borrow is then qtKtþ1  ntþ1. Letting ft denote the external
ﬁnancing cost of one extra unit of capital, the demand for external ﬁnance must satisfy the following condition in
optimum:Et ½ftþ1 ¼ Et mptþ1 þ ð1 dÞqtþ1qt
 
: ð3ÞThe numerator on the right-hand side is the marginal productivity of a unit of capital plus the value of this unit of capital
(net of depreciation) in the next period. Note that we interpret the price of capital qt as the stock price in the model econ-
omy.6 Equity shares are ultimately claims to the assets of ﬁrms, which in this model amounts to their capital stock. Therefore, inddition, we provide further details about the model, its properties, and the solution in an extended online Appendix.
notable exception is the study by Faia and Monacelli (2007), who instead use the agency cost framework of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). Importantly,
r, Faia and Monacelli (2007) modify that framework so as to obtain a countercyclical external ﬁnance premium, which is a key feature of the model of
e et al. (1999).
ontrast, Bernanke et al. (1999) ensure this by assuming that entrepreneurs also work. This difference is of little importance for the results.
he rest of the paper, we will use the terms price of capital, asset price and stock price interchangeably.
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prices.7
As in Bernanke et al. (1999), the existence of an agency problem between borrower and lender renders external ﬁnance
more costly than internal ﬁnance. While entrepreneurs observe the outcome of their investments costlessly, the ﬁnancial
intermediary must pay an auditing cost to observe this outcome. Entrepreneurs must decide – after observing the outcome
– whether to report a success or a failure of the project, i.e. whether to repay or default on the loan. If they default, the ﬁnan-
cial intermediary pays the auditing cost, and then claims the returns to the investment. Bernanke et al. (1999) demonstrate
that the optimal ﬁnancial contract involves an external ﬁnance premium (the difference between the cost of external and
internal ﬁnance) which depends on the entrepreneur’s net worth, and show that the marginal external ﬁnancing cost is equal
to the external ﬁnance premium times the opportunity cost of the investment; given by the risk-free real interest rate (the
reader is referred to Bernanke et al. (1999) for details):7 Thi
to the p
Please
econoEt ½ftþ1 ¼ Et W ntþ1qtKtþ1
 
Rt
ptþ1
 
; ð4Þwhere the function WðÞ describes how the external ﬁnance premium depends on the ﬁnancial position of the ﬁrm. ntþ1qtKtþ1 de-
notes the ratio of the ﬁrm’s internal ﬁnancing to its total ﬁnancing, and is thus a measure of the leverage ratio. Eq. (4) is the
key to the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. Bernanke et al. (1999) demonstrate that W0 ð Þ < 0, implying that if ﬁrms’ net
worth goes up (or, equivalently, their leverage ratio goes down), the external ﬁnance premium falls, and ﬁrms get cheaper
access to credit. As the entrepreneur puts more of his own money behind the project, thus lowering the leverage ratio, the
agency problem between borrower and lender is alleviated. The entrepreneur’s incentive to undertake projects with a high
probability of success increases, and as a result, the lender demands a lower return on the loans he makes. The drop in the
external ﬁnance premium leads to an increase in the ﬁrm’s demand for external ﬁnance, which in turn causes an increase in
the ﬁrm’s stock of capital in the next period, and thus its production level. In this way, to the extent that movements in net
worth are procyclical, the ﬁnancial accelerator works to amplify business cycle movements.
The net worth of entrepreneurs consists of the ﬁnancial wealth they have accumulated (i.e., proﬁts earned in previous
periods) plus the bequest !t they receive from entrepreneurs leaving the economy:ntþ1 ¼ m ftqt1Kt  Et1ftðqt1Kt  ntÞ½  þ ð1 mÞ!t: ð5Þ2.2. Households
A continuum (of unit length) of households derive utility from an index of the ﬁnal consumption goods produced by the
retailers ðCtÞ and leisure ð1 HtÞ, and decide how much labor to supply to entrepreneurs producing intermediate goods. As
all households are identical, they each solve the following utility maximization problem:maxCt ;Ht ;DtU ¼ E0
X1
t¼0
bt
c
c 1 ln C
c1
c
t
 
þ g lnð1 HtÞ
 
; ð6Þsubject to the relevant budget constraint:Ct þ Dt  Rt1Dt1Pt 6
Wt
Pt
Ht þXt : ð7ÞDt are deposits which are stored at a ﬁnancial intermediary at the risk-free rate of interest Rt . Xt denotes dividend payments
deriving from households’ ownership of retail ﬁrms. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the household are presented in the online
Appendix.
2.3. Capital producers
The role of capital producers is to construct new capital Ktþ1 from invested ﬁnal goods It and existing capital. As in
Bernanke et al. (1999), it is implicitly assumed that capital producers rent existing capital from entrepreneurs within each
period at a rental rate of zero. They face capital adjustment costs, implying a non-constant price of capital qt . We use the
same quadratic functional form for the capital adjustment costs as Christensen and Dib (2008): v2
It
Kt
 d
 2
Kt . Proﬁts of capital
producers are then:Pct ¼ qtIt  It 
v
2
It
Kt
 d
 2
Kt : ð8ÞChoosing the level of investment that maximizes this expression results in the following equilibrium condition:s is standard in the literature; see for instance Tetlow (2005) or Gilchrist and Saito (2008). In Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), the central bank reacts
rice of capital plus a bubble term.
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It
Kt
 d
 
¼ 1: ð9ÞNote that in the absence of adjustment costs, the parameter v equals zero, so the optimality condition collapses to qt ¼ 1.8
The condition is essentially a Tobin’s q-relation, ensuring that the investment level is chosen so that the ‘effective’ price of cap-
ital (i.e., net of capital adjustment costs) is equal to 1.
2.4. Retailers
Firms in the retail sector take intermediate goods as inputs, repackage these costlessly, and sell them. The retail sector is
included in the model with the single purpose of creating price stickiness. Following Calvo (1983), price rigidity is introduced
by assuming that in each period, only a fraction 1 nð Þ of ﬁrms in the retail sector are allowed to change their price. The price
of ﬁrms who are not allowed to change their price is indexed with the steady state inﬂation rate p. In other words, this sector
is completely standard. In the online Appendix, we describe the problem of each ﬁrm in the retail sector, and demonstrate
how the associated ﬁrst-order condition gives rise to a standard version of a log-linear New-Keynesian Phillips Curve.
2.5. Monetary policy
To introduce an asymmetric policy reaction to stock prices, we assume that the central bank follows a Taylor rule aug-
mented with a term that captures a reaction to stock price drops. This is in line with the speciﬁcations used by Hoffmann
(2013) and Hall (2011). Ravn (2012) attempts to control for the movements in the interest rate that are driven by macroeco-
nomic variables such as output and inﬂation. Therefore, also his result is interpretable as a reaction to stock prices on top of
the reaction to those variables, in line with the implicit assumption behind an augmented Taylor rule.9 We further add inter-
est rate smoothing, as this tends to improve the empirical performance of Taylor rules (Clarida et al., 1999; Christiano et al.,
2010). This gives rise to the following monetary policy rule:Rt
R
¼ Rt1
R
 qr pt
p
 /p Yt
Y
 /y Dqt
q
 /q( )1 Dqt<0½ 24 35ð1qrÞeert ; ð10Þ
where 1½X is the indicator function; equal to 1 if X is true and zero otherwise. This captures that the central bank is reacting
to the change in stock prices only when this change is negative. ert is a normally distributed monetary policy shock with mean
zero. The stated monetary policy rule allows for interest rate smoothing, as measured by the parameter qr . The parameters
/p and /y measure the monetary policy reaction to deviations of inﬂation from its target level, and of output from its steady
state level, respectively. Note that the steady state or natural level of output (Y) is below the efﬁcient level of output (Y) due
to the presence of monopolistic competition.
While this paper is the ﬁrst to study theoretically a Taylor rule with a reaction to stock price drops, Taylor rules aug-
mented with a symmetric reaction to stock price changes have been studied by Tetlow (2005) and Gilchrist and Saito
(2008) in models largely similar to the one outlined above. A similar type of ‘speed limit’-rule is also studied by Leduc
and Natal (2011). The rule above is essentially a speed-limit rule with no upper speed limit.
2.6. Model solution
To solve the model, we log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic steady state. The log-linearized
model consists of 14 equilibrium conditions in 14 variables as described in the Appendix A, while the steady state is de-
scribed in the online Appendix. The equilibrium of the model consists of a vector of allocations bCt ; bHt ; bY t ; bKt ; bnt ;bIt  and
prices bpt ; bRt ; bwt; cmct;dmpt ; bqt ;bf t ; bkt  such that those 14 log-linear equations are satisﬁed, where bxt denotes log-deviations
of a variable xt from its steady state.
However, the non-linear monetary policy rule implies that even after log-linearization, an important non-linearity re-
mains in the model. As a result, the model cannot be solved with standard techniques. Instead, we solve the model using
a numerical solution method which exploits the piecewise linearity of the model. This method follows the approach taken
by Bodenstein et al. (2009) in order to deal with problems where the zero lower bound on interest rates is binding in a num-
ber of periods. While Bodenstein et al. study a one-off switch, we generalize the solution method to handle multiple switches
between policy regimes. As the only non-linearity in the present model is the monetary policy reaction to asset prices, the
model in effect consists of two linear systems; one for when asset prices are decreasing, and one for when they are non-
decreasing. Following Bodenstein et al. (2009), we ﬁrst build a shooting algorithm in order to identify the ‘turning points’
in the evolution of the asset price following a shock; i.e. when the sign of Dqt , and thus the monetary policy regime, switches.
For any initial guess of the turning points, the model is then solved using backward induction. If the initial guess turns outall that qt is a real price measured in units of consumption. Hence, qt ¼ 1 will hold in the absence of adjustment costs, irrespective of the fact that the
vel on consumption goods ﬂuctuates due to the price stickiness faced by retailers.
act, Ravn (2012) also estimates the reaction to stock prices in an augmented Taylor rule, and obtains similar results.
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until the switching criteria are satisﬁed, as further outlined in the Appendix.
It should be noted that this approach to endogenous regime switching is somewhat different from that of Davig and
Leeper (2006). They solve their model, in which the monetary policy reaction to inﬂation depends on the lagged level of
inﬂation, numerically over a discrete partition of the state space. However, applying this method to our model, which is
considerably larger than that of Davig and Leeper, involves substantial computational problems, as their approach suffers
heavily from the curse of dimensionality. The ability to handle endogenous switching even in a medium-scale DSGE model
is thus an advantage of the shooting method employed in the present paper.10 On the other hand, the shooting method in
effect combines two approximations, as the model is linearized under each regime. This is a potential drawback, albeit a small
one, as the two systems are almost identical. Moreover, observe that the steady state of the model is unaffected by the non-
linear policy, as the reaction to asset price changes will always be zero in steady state. As a result, we are linearizing each of
the systems around the same steady state. A more substantial disadvantage of using a numerical, non-linear solution method
is that it renders welfare calculations unfeasible, and thus prevents an investigation of whether the asymmetric policy is
optimal in terms of welfare.
2.7. Equilibrium determinacy
Following Blanchard and Kahn (1980), equilibrium determinacy of rational expectations models is ensured if the number
of endogenous state variables in the model is equal to the number of stable eigenvalues (i.e., eigenvalues inside the unit cir-
cle) of the matrix governing the law of motion. However, due to our use of a numerical solution method, we are unable to
write the solution analytically as a law of motion on the standard form. As a result, we can only make a formal check of the
Blanchard–Kahn conditions for each of the two piecewise linear systems comprising our model, but not for the model as
such. To make sure that equilibrium determinacy is in fact preserved in our model, we ﬁrst verify that the Blanchard–Kahn
conditions are satisﬁed for each of the two systems. This turns out to be the case, which is not surprising. First, as described
below, the interest rate reaction to inﬂation is larger than 1 in both regimes, as we keep /p ¼ 1:5 constant. In other words,
the Taylor principle is satisﬁed in both systems. Second, Pfajfar and Santoro (2011) show that adding a reaction to asset price
growth does not compromise equilibrium determinacy, but rather promotes it.11 Having established that each of the two sys-
tems satisfy the Blanchard–Kahn conditions, it follows that the model as such also satisﬁes the criteria for equilibrium deter-
minacy. If the model economy switches between two regimes that both satisfy equilibrium determinacy, the model itself will
never be exposed to problems of indeterminacy. It is straightforward to show that in a model where the economy switches be-
tween two regimes, and the monetary policy reaction to inﬂation is strictly larger than 1 in both regimes, the ‘long run Taylor
principle’ of Davig and Leeper (2007), which is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for equilibrium determinacy, is always sat-
isﬁed.12 In particular, the regime-switching probabilities, which in our case are determined by the sign of the stock price change,
have no impact on the conditions for equilibrium determinacy in this case. We conclude that the asymmetric reaction to stock
prices does not in itself lead to equilibrium indeterminacy.
2.8. Calibration
As already mentioned, we obtain most of the parameter values from Christensen and Dib (2008), who estimate a model
largely similar to the one outlined above using US data for the sample period 1979–2004. The parameters that were not esti-
mated by Christensen and Dib are instead calibrated. With a few minor exceptions, we follow the calibration in Christensen
and Dib (2008). The reader is therefore referred to Christensen and Dib for a more detailed discussion of the parameter
values. All parameter values are presented in the Appendix A.
The parameter measuring the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium with respect to changes in ﬁrms’ leverage
position deserves special mention. We use the value w ¼ 0:042 as estimated by Christensen and Dib. This value is somewhat
smaller than the value used by Bernanke et al. (1999) and Gilchrist and Saito (2008) of w ¼ 0:05. This implies that the
ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is less strong in the present paper.
As for monetary policy, the policy rule in our model differs substantially from that of Christensen and Dib (2008). There-
fore, we do not use their parameter estimates. Instead, we set /p ¼ 1:5 as suggested by Taylor (1993). Furthermore we set
/y ¼ 0:2, whereas the interest rate smoothing parameter is set to 0:67, indicating a degree of interest rate smoothing around
2/3 as suggested by, among others, Clarida et al. (1999). Finally, a value must be assigned to the parameter /q, the reaction to
stock price drops. Hoffmann (2013) and Hall (2011) directly estimate this parameter from comparable Taylor rules with
interest rate smoothing.13 For the case of falling stock prices ðDqt < 0Þ, Hoffmann (2013) reports an estimate of 0:331 for10 The shooting method is in fact more similar in spirit to the ‘guess-and-verify’ method used by Máckowiak (2007) in order to study the outbreak of currency
crises. However, common to all these studies is the use of numerical methods. The task of developing analytical tools to deal with endogenous regime switching
is an obvious next step, but beyond the scope of this study.
11 As these authors demonstrate, the reason is that a reaction to asset price growth is isomorphic to a higher degree of interest rate smoothing, which has been
shown to alleviate potential indeterminacy problems.
12 This is shown explicitly in the online Appendix.
13 To be exact, Hoffmann (2013) ﬁnds a reaction to stock price changes relative to the change in the underlying HP-ﬁltered trend, while Hall (2011) ﬁnds a
reaction to the laggedstock price change relative to the change in the fundamental value as measured by dividend yields.
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Fig. 1. Effects of a positive technology shock, no policy reaction to asset prices
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mates from a high-frequency study using daily data. To cast his results in terms of the Taylor rule, the point estimate needs to be
transformed.14 Following the same line of reasoning as Ravn (2012), his estimated result implies a value of /q ¼ 0:0246 when-
ever Dqt < 0.
15
These estimates are quite low. The DSGE literature offers little guidance on the magnitude of this parameter. However,
some information can be obtained from the contributions of Tetlow (2005) and Gilchrist and Saito (2008), who augment
the Taylor rule with a symmetric reaction to the change in stock prices. Tetlow evaluates a rule with a stock price reaction
that is quite large; always bigger than 1. Gilchrist and Saito allow the parameter to take on values between 0:1 and 2:0. In
other words, there seems to be a substantial divergence between estimated and calibrated values of this parameter.16 To
bridge this gap, we therefore perform most of the simulations below for two different values of /q; the estimate of 0:0246 ob-
tained from Ravn (2012), which represents a lower bound for the various empirical estimates, and a value of 0:5, more in line
with the theoretical literature.3. Dynamics of the model
In this section, we investigate the dynamics of the model when the asymmetric monetary policy rule is in place. In linear
models, the impulse response to a positive shock is by construction the mirror image of the response to a negative shock of
the same type and size. In this model, instead, positive and negative shocks have different dynamic effects.
Before looking into the effects of the asymmetric policy, we report the effects of each shock in the model without an
asymmetric policy. Figs. 1 and 2 display the impulse responses of some key endogenous variables to an orthogonalized unit
shock to technology and monetary policy when the policy reaction to stock prices is always zero; /q ¼ 0. Fig. 1 illustrates
that a positive technology shock leads to a rise in output, while inﬂation and the nominal interest rate both fall. Lower inﬂa-
tion in turn implies a higher real cost of repaying outstanding debt, depressing the net worth of ﬁrms. This is the debt-deﬂa-
tion channel. As net worth goes down, the external ﬁnance premium increases. In turn, this dampens economic activity.
Thus, the term ﬁnancial accelerator is in fact misleading in the case of a technology shock when the debt-deﬂation channel
is included, as in this case the ﬂuctuations in output are actually attenuated. This was already noted by Iacoviello (2005). The
presence of the debt-deﬂation channel is crucial for this result, as also demonstrated by Christiano et al. (2010).1714 The interpretation offered by Ravn (2012) relies on the fact that the Federal Open Market Committee meets once every six weeks. The model of the present
paper is formulated (and calibrated) in quarterly terms. This involves an implicit assumption that monetary policy can only be changed every 12 weeks; once
per quarter.
15 In fact, Ravn (2012) also estimates an augmented Taylor rule, and ﬁnds a somewhat larger reaction.
16 Indeed, if one were to use the result of Rigobon and Sack (2003) in the present setting, this would imply a (symmetric) value of /q ¼ 0:0428. One potential
explanation of this divergence is that in theoretical investigations, the researcher is often interested only in policy reactions to stock price changes larger than
some threshold value, while the empirical contributions considered here measure the (presumably smaller) reaction to stock price changes of any size.
17 In a model similar to ours, they ﬁnd that the debt-deﬂation channel and the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism reinforce each other in the wake of shocks that
drive output and inﬂation in the same direction, whereas they counteract each other after shocks that, like the technology shock, drive output and inﬂation in
different directions.
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investment boom following the technology shock. The price of capital ‘undershoots’ its steady state level for a number of
periods, as the persistent drop in net worth leads to a persistent rise in the price of external funding, lowering the demand
for capital (and thus, the asset price) even many periods after the shock. The reason that net worth and the price of capital
move in different directions is that the initial (and numerically quite small) increase in the price of capital is the result of two
opposing effects: While the positive technology shock increases investment and the price of capital; the resulting rise in the
external ﬁnance premium has the exact opposite effect.
Fig. 2 illustrates the dynamics after a positive innovation to monetary policy.18 In this case, the ﬁnancial accelerator does
work to amplify business cycle ﬂuctuations. The rise in the interest rate depresses economic activity and in particular invest-
ment, reducing the price of capital. This leads to a drop in the net worth of ﬁrms, which is further enhanced by the drop in inﬂa-
tion through the debt-deﬂation channel. Lower net worth increases the external ﬁnance premium, which further depresses
investment and output. These dynamics explain why this mechanism is referred to as the ﬁnancial accelerator.
In the online Appendix, we show that introducing a moderate, symmetric policy reaction to asset price changes does not
lead to major changes in the dynamics described above. We also demonstrate that the same is true for a policy rule with a
reaction to stock price deviationsfrom their steady state level, as suggested by Faia and Monacelli (2007) and Gilchrist and
Saito (2008), among others.3.1. Dynamics under asymmetric policy
Having discussed the effects of each shock in the absence of asymmetric policy, we now turn to study how these effects
are altered when an asymmetric monetary policy rule is introduced. When computing impulse responses, we use the value
of /q ¼ 0:5 in order to clearly illustrate the effects of the asymmetric policy. For each shock, we compare the effects of po-
sitive and negative shocks on the dynamics of key endogenous variables. Consider ﬁrst the effects of a technology shock.
Fig. 3 illustrates what happens after positive and negative technology shocks. The ‘mirror image’ of a negative shock is just
the impulse responses of the negative shock multiplied by 1; facilitating comparison. As illustrated, the asymmetric policy
has a dampening effect on contractions in output relative to expansions. A positive technology shock causes output to in-
crease by more than it decreases following a similar-sized negative shock. The explanation is that in the wake of a negative
technology shock, the asset price is pushed down for a number of periods (except for the effect on impact, when the asset
price actually rises). Under the asymmetric policy, this drop in asset prices is met with an interest rate cut (although this cut
is dominated by the increase in the interest rate as a reaction to the jump in inﬂation), spurring economic activity and thus
dampening the initial economic slowdown. On the other hand, as asset prices rise following a positive technology shock, this
induces no increase in the interest rate per se. In other words, output contractions following technology shocks are mitigated
by an interest rate reaction to asset prices, while output expansions are not. Also for inﬂation, increases will be larger than
drops, as the interest rate reaction to asset prices exerts an upward pressure on inﬂation following a negative shock, but no18 While some of the variables appear to have stabilized at non-zero values at the end of the period displayed, we have checked that all variables eventually
return to zero.
Please cite this article in press as: Ravn, S.H. Asymmetric monetary policy towards the stock market: A DSGE approach. Journal of Macro-
economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2013.11.002
Fig. 3. Effects of a technology shock, asymmetric model. Solid blue line: Positive shock. Dashed red line: Mirror image of negative shock. (For interpretation
of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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metric policy implies that the decline following a negative shock is less severe than the boom following a positive shock. It
thus seems that the policy reaction to asset price drops succeeds in mitigating these drops. The quantitative impact of the
asymmetric policy on the macroeconomy is quite small, though, as indicated by the small absolute distance between the
impulse responses for the positive and (mirrored) negative shocks.
It is interesting to compare the effects on the asset price to the effects of a similar-sized shock with no stock price reaction
(Fig. 1). As the negative shock induces a monetary policy reaction to the drop in stock prices, it is not surprising that the
effects of a negative shock (Fig. 3) are numerically smaller than the effects of a positive shock under no stock price reaction
at all. However, we also observe that the increase in the asset price following a positive shock is larger under the asymmetric
policy than in the absence of an asset price reaction. As the asset price increases immediately after a positive technology
shock, both models imply no reaction of monetary policy to this increase. Under the asymmetric policy, however, agents
realize that whenever asset prices start to fall, this drop will be alleviated by a monetary policy reaction. This expectation
drives up the asset price more than in the case where the reaction to asset prices is always zero, giving rise to an ‘anticipation
boom’. This anticipation boom measures the additional increase of the asset price under asymmetric policy, relative to its
increase in the case of no stock price reaction following a positive shock. Quantitatively, the anticipation boom is quite sub-
stantial under the calibration with /q ¼ 0:5; amounting to 23.9% when evaluated two periods after the shock; the last period
before the asset price starts to fall and monetary policy actually starts reacting to asset price changes. On the other hand,
using the smallest of the estimated values (/q ¼ 0:0246), the number is reduced to only 1.1%. Recall that the other empirical
estimates were all in the range between these two values.
Consider ﬁnally the asymmetric effects on the two ﬁnancial variables, net worth and the external ﬁnance premium. Recall
that because of the debt-deﬂation channel, net worth is depressed after a positive technology shock, as the drop in inﬂation
increases the real burden of ﬁrms’ debt repayments. However, it is apparent that the effect on net worth is much larger fol-
lowing a negative shock. After a positive shock, the drop in net worth is counteracted by the rise in the asset price. In the case
of a negative shock, this effect is much weaker, as the drop in asset prices is much smaller. Indeed, after a negative shock, the
asset price rises in the ﬁrst period, which is exactly where most of the difference arises in the effects on net worth. As net
worth is highly persistent, so is this difference. In turn, also the external ﬁnance premium is affected more by a negative
shock, which is unsurprising given the movements in net worth.
Fig. 4 illustrates the asymmetric effects of contractionary and expansionary monetary policy shocks. Once again, output
and inﬂation both drop following a contractionary monetary policy shock. An expansionary shock, however, induces an even
larger increase in output and inﬂation. As was the case for technology shocks, then, the asymmetric policy implies that when
the economy is hit by monetary policy shocks, booms become larger than recessions, once again creating an asymmetric
business cycle. The explanation is again linked to the movements in the asset price. Following a contractionary shock, the
asset price goes down, inducing the central bank to cut the interest rate. This mitigates the initial economic downturn caused
by the shock, and also pushes inﬂation up. On the other hand, the rise in asset prices following an expansionary shock is not
met with any monetary policy reaction, so the counteracting effect is not present in that case. Furthermore, adding to the
asymmetric effects on output and inﬂation stemming from the monetary policy reaction to asset prices, the increase inPlease cite this article in press as: Ravn, S.H. Asymmetric monetary policy towards the stock market: A DSGE approach. Journal of Macro-
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Fig. 4. Effects of a monetary policy shock, asymmetric model. Solid blue line: Contractionary shock. Dashed red line: Mirror image of expansionary shock.
(For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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cheaper access to credit for ﬁrms, increasing the demand for capital, the investment level, and eventually output. Note that
while the nominal interest rate does not display a large, numerical difference, the real interest rate, which matters for con-
sumption and investment decisions, is affected differently during expansionary and contractionary phases, as implied by the
impulse responses for inﬂation. As a result, the macroeconomic effects of the asymmetric policy are much larger than in the
case of technology shocks.
As in the case of technology shocks, an expansionary shock to monetary policy leads to ananticipation boom in asset
prices. This is evident when comparing the effects of an expansionary shock under asymmetric policy (Fig. 4) to the
effects in the case of no stock price reaction (Fig. 2). In the case of monetary policy shocks, the anticipation boom is
evaluated one period after the shock; the last period before the asset price starts declining. The extra rise in asset prices
is substantial, 28.1%, when /q is set to 0:5. Using instead the much smaller estimated value from Ravn (2012), the
number drops to 1.1%.
The emergence of the anticipation boom can be related to what Davig and Leeper (2006) call the preemption dividend. In
their model, the central bank is assumed to react stronger to inﬂation if the lagged inﬂation level is above a certain threshold
(the inﬂation target). Rational agents will embed this non-linearity in their inﬂation expectations. As a consequence, mon-
etary policy will be more effective in bringing down inﬂation in the wake of an inﬂationary shock, compared to a situation
with a linear reaction to inﬂation. As the central bank is able to successfully manage expectations, the actual increase in the
interest rate does not have to be very large. In our setup, agents embed the monetary policy reaction to stock price drops in
their expectations, leading to a larger increase in asset prices immediately after a positive shock. This happens despite the
fact that when asset prices are increasing, as in the ﬁrst period(s) after the shock, the actual monetary policy reaction to asset
prices is zero under the asymmetric policy as well as with no reaction to asset prices at all. As the preemptive dividend of
Davig and Leeper (2006), the anticipation boom arises solely due to the central bank’s ability to manage the expectations of
private agents. In this way, the asymmetric monetary policy ampliﬁes the boom-bust cycle in asset prices following a shock
to the economy, thereby creating additional volatility in asset prices.19
The results above can be related to some of the results from the empirical literature on asymmetric business cycles. The
ﬁnding that the asymmetric policy ampliﬁes booms relative to recessions seems to contradict a number of empirical stud-
ies which tend to ﬁnd that recessions are bigger than booms (Neftci, 1984; Acemoglu and Scott, 1997). This suggests that
an asymmetric policy of the type investigated above has not historically been driving the business cycle. For several
reasons, this is not particularly surprising. First, the recent empirical ﬁndings are obtained only for relatively short sam-
ples, especially in the case of Ravn (2012). Second, these results are of too little quantitative importance to be a dominant
driver of the business cycle. On the other hand, Beaudry and Koop (1993) ﬁnd that negative shocks to the economy are
much less persistent than positive ones, implying that recessions should be shorter than booms. This is more in line with19 Finally, and similar to Davig and Leeper (2006), we ﬁnd substantial differences between the impulse responses shown above, which take into account that
agents anticipate the possibility of future regime switches, and the impulse responses (not shown, but available upon request) obtained when agents naively
expect the present regime to be in place forever.
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too small to match the ﬁndings of Beaudry and Koop. Finally, the implications of an asymmetric policy are also consistent
with the results of Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008) and Wolters (2012), who ﬁnd that the Federal Reserve has displayed
a recession avoidance preference in the recent past.20 According to these studies, estimated reaction functions for the
Federal Reserve indicate that US monetary policymakers tend to react more strongly to the output gap during recessions than
during expansions. This creates outcomes that are in line with the impulse responses displayed above, suggesting that
an asymmetric reaction to stock prices can be rationalized by recession avoidance preferences. This is further discussed in
the next section.4. Potential motivations for an asymmetric policy
As demonstrated by the impulse responses in the previous section, reacting asymmetrically to asset prices can lead
to a situation in which recessions are attenuated relative to expansions. This raises the question of whether one could
think of the central bank as aiming to obtain exactly such an asymmetric outcome. While the central bank is usually
assumed to minimize a fully symmetric loss function (e.g. Woodford, 2003), it is not given that the objective of the cen-
tral bank should be perfectly symmetric. Among others, Blinder (1997), Ruge-Murcia (2004), and Surico (2003, 2007)
suggest that the central bank could be seeking to minimize an asymmetric loss function. For example, Ruge-Murcia
(2004) assumes that the social loss associated with high unemployment exceeds the social beneﬁts when unemployment
is low.21 If the loss function of the central bank is asymmetric, this could serve as motivation for an asymmetric stock price
reaction.
Moreover, even if the loss function of the central bank is of the usual, symmetric form, this does not necessarily imply that
the tools of the central bank should also be symmetric. Indeed, if the central bank believes that certain asymmetries exist in
the economy, for example that stock price drops and increases have asymmetric macroeconomic effects, an asymmetric pol-
icy might be seen as an attempt to correct for this inherent asymmetry, and in turn obtain symmetric outcomes. Ravn (2012)
acknowledges this possibility, and points out two potential sources of asymmetric effects of stock prices. In the following, we
study each of them in more detail.
4.1. Asymmetric ﬁnancial accelerator
One channel which may give rise to asymmetric effects of stock price movements is the ﬁnancial accelerator. The possi-
bility of a non-linear ﬁnancial accelerator has received some attention in the literature (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Gertler
and Gilchrist, 1994; Bernanke et al., 1996). During a recession, when asset prices tend to be falling, more ﬁrms are likely to be
liquidity constrained and in need of external ﬁnancing. Moreover, small changes in the net worth of ﬁrms are likely to be
more costly when the collateral value of ﬁrms is already low, and the agency costs of borrowing are already large. Ultimately,
a credit crunch might result. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Peersman and Smets (2005) have provided empirical support
for the hypothesis that the ﬁnancial accelerator may be more relevant in bad times.
In the model of this paper, the strength of the ﬁnancial accelerator is measured by the elasticity of the external ﬁnance
premium with respect to the net worth of ﬁrms. To see this directly, consider the log-linearized version of Eq. (4):20 On
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As seen from (11), the impact on the external ﬁnance premium of changes in the ﬁrm’s leverage ratio is determined by the
magnitude of the parameter w. The larger is w, the stronger is the effect on the external ﬁnance premium, and thus on the
business cycle, of a given change in net worth. In other words, an asymmetric ﬁnancial accelerator can be modeled by allow-
ing w to take on different values. In particular, in light of the above discussion, we allow w to take on one value (wL) for the
case when net worth is above its steady state value, i.e., bnt > 0, and a higher value (wH) when bnt < 0. In this way, the ﬁnancial
accelerator becomes a source of asymmetric business cycle ﬂuctuations by amplifying bad economic shocks more than good
ones.
Consider ﬁrst the effects of technology shocks in the presence of this asymmetry. After a positive shock, net worth
drops below its steady state value, implying that the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium becomes high. This exerts
a downward pressure on output through the accelerator effect, dampening the initial boom, while the drop in inﬂation is
ampliﬁed. In the case of a negative technology shock, net worth instead rises, so the dampening of the initial downturn in
output is small. Hence, the drop in output is large, which in turn mitigates the increase in inﬂation. In consequence, the
effects of positive and negative shocks are asymmetric.22 By following an asymmetric policy and cutting the interest rate inthe contrary, Surico (2007) ﬁnds no evidence of a recession avoidance preference in the US.
cent strand of the literature has suggested that policymakers may instead have a preference for robustness towards model uncertainty. Ellison and
(2012) provide an example of how such a preference may rationalize alternative policy outcomes. A preference for robustness could potentially
ize an asymmetric policy towards stock prices, although this remains to be explored.
e that the debt-deﬂation channel is not critical for this conclusion. Without the debt-deﬂation channel, net worth would be procyclical after technology
(Gilchrist and Saito (2008)). An asymmetric ﬁnancial accelerator would then amplify recessions more than booms.
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Table 1
Asymmetric ﬁnancial accelerator, technology shocks.
Value of /q Value of wL Calibrated value of wH Ratio
wH
wL
0.0246 0.042 0.043 1.02
0.50 0.042 0.059 1.40
12 S.H. Ravn / Journal of Macroeconomics xxx (2013) xxx–xxxresponse to the drop in stock prices after a negative shock, the central bank can drive up output and inﬂation, and thereby
mimic (the mirror image of) a positive shock. In fact, for a given ‘degree’ of asymmetry of the ﬁnancial accelerator, there
exists a magnitude of the asymmetric policy reaction (/q) that exactly eliminates the initial asymmetry after supply-side
shocks.
It turns out that the same is not true after shocks originating from the demand side. An expansionary shock to monetary
policy pushes up net worth, so that the ﬁnancial accelerator is relatively weak. The resulting ampliﬁcation of the initial boom
in output is limited, while the increase in inﬂation is relatively large. On the other hand, the ﬁnancial accelerator is much
stronger following a contractionary monetary policy shock due to the drop in net worth, resulting in a large drop in output
and a strong dampening of the initial drop in inﬂation. An asymmetric policy induces an interest rate cut in response to the
stock price drop after the contractionary shock. While this dampens the drop in output, again mimicking the mirror image of
a positive shock, it also mitigates further the drop in inﬂation, which was already ‘too small’ compared to the relatively large
increase in inﬂation after a positive shock. In other words, a trade-off arises between bringing output or inﬂation to their
‘symmetric’ values. While the asymmetric policy might alleviate the effects of a non-linear ﬁnancial accelerator, it never ob-
tains the fully symmetric outcome.23 This will in general be the case for shocks that drive output and inﬂation in the same
direction, as demand shocks tend to do.
To shed light on the empirical relevance of these issues, it seems natural to ask: How severe should the asymmetry of
the ﬁnancial accelerator be in order to ‘rationalize’ the recent empirical ﬁndings about asymmetric monetary policy, in
the sense that this policy ‘cancels out’ the asymmetric ﬁnancial accelerator under supply shocks, or obtains the most
favorable trade-off under demand shocks? In order to quantify the necessary degree of asymmetry, we ﬁx the elasticity
of the external ﬁnance premium at the baseline value of wL ¼ 0:042 when net worth is above its steady state value. We
then use impulse response matching of output and inﬂation responses for positive and negative shocks to calibrate the
‘optimal’ value of wH .
24 This value can then be compared to wL. Table 1 shows the degree of asymmetry needed to opti-
mally match the impulse responses of output and inﬂation to technology shocks for different values of /q, the reaction
coefﬁcient of monetary policy to stock price changes. As the table illustrates, the degree of asymmetry in the ﬁnancial
accelerator needed to match impulse responses is quite sensitive to the choice of /q. For the value found by Ravn
(2012), the balance-sheet channel needs to be only slightly asymmetric (2% stronger when net worth is low, compared
to when it is high) in order for the two asymmetries to ‘cancel each other out’ under supply shocks. If instead /q is set
at 0:50, this number rises to 40%.
For the same values of /q, Table 2 shows the degree of asymmetry of the ﬁnancial accelerator needed to obtain the most
favorable trade-off between symmetry in output and in inﬂation after monetary policy shocks. If the policy reaction to stock
price changes is set at /q ¼ 0:50, the balance-sheet effect has to be much stronger (77%) during periods of low net worth in
order to minimize the distance to the symmetric outcome. For a policy reaction of the size estimated by Ravn (2012), the
number reduces to 8%.
To put these numbers in perspective, we look to the empirical study of an asymmetric ﬁnancial accelerator by Peersman
and Smets (2005). They show that a positive innovation of 1%-point to the interest rate causes a drop in the growth rate of
output of 0.22%-points during a boom, but a much larger drop of 0.66%-points during a recession. They then estimate how
various measures of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial position contribute in explaining this asymmetry. They ﬁnd that if ﬁrms’ leverage ratio
increases by 5% of its average value, the difference between the effect on output growth of a monetary policy shock in booms
and in recessions increases by 0.14%-points; i.e. from the original 0.44%-points to 0.58%-points. In other words, the ﬁnancial
position of ﬁrms is able to account for substantial asymmetries over the business cycle, indicating that the ﬁnancial accel-
erator effect is considerably stronger in recessions than in booms. In this light, the degrees of asymmetry computed above to
‘rationalize’ the results of Ravn (2012) do not seem unrealistic. The other empirical results require a somewhat higher, but
not necessarily unrealistic degree of asymmetry.23 To visualize these scenarios, observe that an asymmetric ﬁnancial accelerator induces a ‘kink’ in both the aggregate demand (AD) and aggregate supply (AS)
curves, as ﬁrms are on the demand side of the market for ﬁnancing, but on the supply side of the goods market. Through an asymmetric policy reaction of the
‘right’ size, the central bank can eliminate the kink in the AD curve, but not in the AS curve. As a consequence, shocks to aggregate supply shifts the AS curve
along the resulting, potentially linear AD curve, giving rise to symmetric outcomes of positive and negative shocks. On the other hand, the AD curve will
intersect steep or ﬂat areas of the non-linear AS curve in response to positive or negative shocks, respectively.
24 More speciﬁcally; for each of the two types of shocks, we focus on the impulse responses of output and inﬂation. We then compute the sum of squared
errors (SSE) between the impulse response to a positive shock and the mirror image of the impulse response to a negative shock. For this, we use the values in
the ﬁrst 16 periods after the shock. Finally, we solve for the value of wH that minimizes the sum of the SSE’s.
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Table 2
Asymmetric ﬁnancial accelerator, monetary policy shocks.
Value of /q Value of wL Calibrated value of wH Ratio
wH
wL
0.0246 0.042 0.0455 1.08
0.50 0.042 0.0745 1.77
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Another possible source of asymmetric macroeconomic effects of stock price movements is the wealth effect on con-
sumption. Shirvani and Wilbratte (2000) and Apergis and Miller (2006) provide empirical evidence that the wealth effect
of stock prices is stronger when stock prices are declining than when they are increasing. One possible, theoretical explana-
tion for this ﬁnding is provided by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory introduces an inherent
asymmetry in agents’ preferences, as the utility loss from bad outcomes is assumed to be larger than the utility gain from
good outcomes. If agents display such loss aversion in consumption, as suggested by, among others, Koszegi and Rabin
(2009), this might give rise to non-linear effects on consumption from asset price movements, as the wealth effect will
be stronger in the face of declining asset prices. Gaffeo et al. (2012) show that in a DSGE model with loss aversion in con-
sumption, optimal monetary policy features an asymmetric reaction to inﬂation.
With the introduction of loss aversion in consumption into our model, an expansionary shock to monetary policy
would still drive up inﬂation, output and the asset price. However, the weak wealth effect would attenuate the boom
in output. At the same time, more labor would be needed to satisfy the extra demand. However, with consumption
increasing, the labor supply of households would be relatively low, giving rise to a large increase in marginal costs and
inﬂation. Instead, after a monetary contraction the wealth effect would be strong, inducing a large drop in output, but also
an increase in labor supply to compensate for the loss in consumption. Hence, the drop in inﬂation would be relatively
small. A reaction to the drop in stock prices would be able to offset the direct wealth effect, but not the effects on the
labor-leisure decision.
As for supply shocks, the initial rise in asset prices following a positive innovation to technology would lead to only a
small wealth effect, moderating the boom in output and amplifying the drop in inﬂation. A negative technology shock would
instead cause a large drop in output through a strong, negative wealth effect. At the same time, the rise in inﬂation would be
modest due to the increase in labor supply. An asymmetric reaction to the stock price drop will tend to push up inﬂation and
output, bringing both variables closer to the mirror image of a positive shock. In sum, if the stock wealth effect is assumed to
be asymmetric over the business cycle, an asymmetric policy is able to ‘correct for’ this asymmetry and obtain symmetric
outcomes only in the case of supply-side shocks, while a trade-off arises after demand-side shocks, just as we saw in the
previous subsection.255. Concluding remarks
The present paper provides some theoretical inputs to the recent debate concerning a potentially asymmetric reaction of
monetary policy to stock prices. We demonstrate that an asymmetric policy towards the stock market will translate into an
asymmetric business cycle. Booms in output following expansionary shocks will tend to be ampliﬁed, while recessions will
be dampened. A similar pattern emerges for inﬂation. This could be motivated by assuming that the desire of the policy-
maker is to minimize an asymmetric loss function, or by the existence of other asymmetries in the economy. We show that
if the ﬁnancial accelerator or the stock wealth effect is assumed to be non-linear over the business cycle, an asymmetric
monetary policy can obtain symmetric outcomes in response to supply shocks, but only partly alleviate such asymmetries
after demand shocks.
The magnitude of the asymmetric policy reaction found in recent empirical studies is rather small, and our analysis shows
that its quantitative impact on the macroeconomy is limited. This is especially the case when economic ﬂuctuations are
driven by technology shocks. The asymmetric policy exerts a small additional effect on movements in output and inﬂation.
It also does not lead to problems of equilibrium indeterminacy.
Although an asymmetric policy reaction to stock prices might be useful in order to eliminate or mitigate other asymme-
tries, it also implies a risk of creating moral hazard problems by effectively insulating stock market investors from part of
their downside risk. As a matter of fact, this has been at the heart of the critique of the pre-crisis consensus and the plea
to take the ‘a’ out of ‘asymmetry’ in the policy approach to asset prices (Mishkin, 2010; Issing, 2011). The potential moral25 A related line of argument, also deriving from prospect theory, is that gains and losses in ﬁnancial wealth might have direct, asymmetric effects on utility.
Barberis et al. (2001) assume that agents display loss aversion with respect to ﬂuctuations in their ﬁnancial wealth. In that case, an asymmetric policy could be
an attempt to cushion agents from the utility losses when asset prices decline.
Please cite this article in press as: Ravn, S.H. Asymmetric monetary policy towards the stock market: A DSGE approach. Journal of Macro-
economics (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2013.11.002
14 S.H. Ravn / Journal of Macroeconomics xxx (2013) xxx–xxxhazard problems of an asymmetric monetary policy towards the stock market was already analyzed by Miller et al. (2001).
In the present paper, this issue is linked to the anticipation boom in asset prices that arises following expansionary shocks as
a result of the asymmetric policy. However, we have not attempted to analyze the potential moral hazard problems in detail.
A comprehensive study of how an asymmetric monetary policy can cause moral hazard problems by distorting the
incentives of the individual investor would require an even richer microfoundation than that of the present paper, explicitly
modeling the investment decision. While this is surely an interesting idea for future research, it is beyond the scope of
this paper.
The present paper follows most of the modern macroeconomic literature by log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions
around a steady state. Thus, by construction, the economy eventually returns to the same steady state following a shock. This
inherent limitation implies that it is not possible to study whether the asymmetric policy might push the economy to a new
steady state. For example, if economic booms are consistently stronger and longer than recessions, as suggested by the im-
pulse responses, one would eventually expect a ‘level’ effect on output. Another question is whether the asymmetric policy
will sooner or later drive the interest rate to its zero lower bound. Due to the limitations of the log-linear approach, the mod-
el above does not have much to say about such issues.Acknowledgements
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Appendix A describes the calibration, the equilibrium conditions, and the solution method.A.1. Calibration
See Table A1.Table A1
Parameter values.
Parameter Interpretation Value
a Capital share in production 0:3384
b Discount factor 0:984
c Preference for consumption 0:0598
d Depreciation rate 0:025
p Elasticity of substitution between ﬁnal goods 6
g Preference for leisure 1:315
m Entrepreneurs’ survival rate 0:9600
n Probability of not adjusting price 0:7418
v Importance of capital adjustment cost 0:5882
w Elasticity of ext. ﬁn. premium wrt. leverage 0:042
W Steady state external ﬁnance premium 1:0250
p Steady state inﬂation rate 1
K
n Rate of capital to net worth in steady state 1:8
qr Degree of interest rate smoothing 0:67
/p Monetary policy reaction to inﬂation 1:5
/y Monetary policy reaction to output 0:2
/q Monetary policy reaction to stock price drops (estimated) 0:0246
/q Monetary policy reaction to stock price drops (calibrated) 0:5
qa Persistence of technology shock 0:7625
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We log-linearize the conditions describing the equilibrium around the steady state of the model. For details, see the on-
line Appendix. In the following, bxt will denote the log-deviation of variable xt from its value in the nonstochastic steady state;
denoted x.Please
econobkt ¼ bCt; ðA1Þ
HbHt ¼ ð1 HÞ bkt þ bwt ; ðA2Þ
bkt ¼ Etbktþ1  Et bptþ1 þ bRt; ðA3Þ
bY t ¼ ð1 aÞbAt þ ð1 aÞbHt þ abKt ; ðA4Þ
dmpt ¼ bY t þ cmct  bKt; ðA5Þ
bw ¼ bY t þ cmct  bHt; ðA6Þ
bf tþ1 ¼ mpf dmptþ1 þ 1 df bqtþ1  bqt; ðA7Þ
Etbf tþ1  bRt  Et bptþ1  ¼ wEt bntþ1  bqt  bKtþ1 ; ðA8Þ
bntþ1 ¼ Kn bf t þ 1 Kn
  bRt1  bpt þ w 1 Kn
  bqt1 þ bKt þ 1þ w Kn  1
  bnt ; ðA9Þ
bKtþ1 ¼ IK bIt þ ð1 dÞbKt; ðA10Þ
bqt ¼ v bIt  bKt ; ðA11Þ
bRt ¼ qrbRt1 þ 1 qrð Þ /p bpt þ /ybY t þ /q Dbqt < 0 	Dbqth iþ ert ; ðA12Þ
Y bY t ¼ CbCt þ IbIt ; ðA13Þ
bpt ¼ bEt bptþ1 þ 1 nð Þð1 bnÞn cmct : ðA14ÞThese 14 equations in 14 variables characterize the log-linearized economy.
A.3. The solution method
As the solution method we use is an extension of the work of Bodenstein et al. (2009), the rest of this Appendix builds on
their Appendix A. The log-linearized version of the model consists of Eqs. (A1)–(A14). Note that the monetary policy condi-
tion (A12) is not linear, as the value of the parameter /q depends on the sign of Dbqt . However, the model is piecewise linear,
in the sense that given one of the two possible values of /q, all equations are linear. This is the key insight underlying the
solution method. We can represent each of the two linear systems in the following way, stacking the 14 equations and
14 variables. Let0 ¼ AEtstþ1 þ Bst þ Cst1 þ Det ðA15Þ
describe the dynamics of the system when the asset price is non-decreasing, i.e. when the monetary policy reaction to the
asset price is zero. Further, let0 ¼ AEtstþ1 þ Bst þ Cst1 þ Det ðA16Þ
denote the equivalent system when the asset price is decreasing and monetary policy involves a non-zero reaction to
the asset price. The vector s contains all the variables in log-deviations from their steady state values:
st ¼ bKt ; bnt ; bqt ; bRt ; bCt ; bHt ; bkt ; bf t ; bY t ;bIt ; bwt ; bpt ;dmpt ; cmcth i0. The matrices A;B;C, and A;B;C are N  N coefﬁcient matrices,
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 	0 is the vector of shocks, and D and D are N M coefﬁ-
cient matrices, with M ¼ 2 representing the number of shocks. The elements of the coefﬁcient matrices derive from
the log-linear system of equations presented above. Note that the only difference between the two systems is the
reaction of monetary policy to asset price changes; i.e., whether /q ¼ 0 in Eq. (A12) or not. This affects only the matri-
ces multiplying st and st1. In other words, A ¼ A, and D ¼ D. Further, the matrices B and B differ in only one entry,
and the same is true for C and C: If the monetary policy reaction function is listed as the nth equation in the system,
and the price of capital appears as the mth variable in the vector s, then these matrices differ only in the (n,m)th
entry.
As each of these two systems are linear, they can be solved separately using well-known methods such as the Toolkit
method of Uhlig (1999), which we use, or the Gensys method of Sims (2002). The solutions can then also be written on ma-
trix form, as the evolution of the endogenous variables are fully described by the lagged values of the state variables and the
realizations of the shocks. Hence, the solutions to the above systems are, respectively:26 Unl
27 Of c
28 The
are unc
Please
econost ¼ Pst1 þ Qet ; ðA17Þ
st ¼ Pst1 þ Q et : ðA18ÞAssume that a shock hits the economy in period 0. As the economy starts out in the regime with no reaction to stock price
changes, the ﬁrst regime change will occur the ﬁrst time the change in the asset price (Dqt ¼ qt  qt1) becomes negative.
Depending on the shock, this may happen on impact or after a number of periods.26 Once the regime has shifted, it may shift
back, or it may remain in the new regime.27 In principle, an arbitrary number of regime shifts might take place, depending on
the evolution of the asset price.
In order to illustrate the idea behind the solution method, consider the evolution of the asset price following a positive
technology shock; the lower left panel of Fig. 1 at the end of the main text.28 Evidently, this impulse response involves two
turning points; which we call T1 and T2, i.e. points where the sign of the change in the asset price switches. After the second
turning point, the stock price is increasing, so the dynamics of the economy are described by the solution to the model with no
reaction to asset prices (and no further shocks):st ¼ Pst1; t > T2: ðA19Þ
Consider now the dynamics for T1 < t 6 T2, for which the monetary policy reaction to asset prices is non-zero. We use
backward induction to trace out the evolution of the endogenous variables in these periods. As no shocks are assumed to
hit the economy outside period 0, it follows from (A19) that sT2þ1 ¼ PsT2 . This is useful in the last period before the shift
(t ¼ T2), where the following is true:0 ¼ AEtsT2þ1 þ BsT2 þ CsT21 ()
sT2 ¼ C1sT21;C1   AP þ B
 1
C: ðA20ÞIn similar fashion, we can derive an expression for the second-last period before the shift (t ¼ T2  1). Let A ¼ ðBÞ1A,
and C ¼ ðBÞ1C. Then;0 ¼ AEtsT2 þ BsT21 þ CsT22 ()
sT21 ¼ ðI  AC1Þ1CsT22: ðA21Þ
Thus, by recursive substitutions, we can express the endogenous variables at any point in this interval as a function of
their 1-period lagged values. In the general case, we get:st ¼ CT2tþ1st1; T1 < t 6 T2; ðA22Þ
where, for each t;CT2tþ1 ¼ ðI  ACT2tÞ1C;
recalling the deﬁnition of C1  AP þ B
 1
C. In fact, the recursivity of the problem allows us to write st for each period in
this interval as a function of sT1þ1; the ﬁrst period in this interval:st ¼
Yt1
i¼1
CT2i
 !
sT1þ1: ðA23Þess the asset price remains forever constant, however, it will happen sooner or later, as the asset price must return to its initial value.
ourse, the economy will eventually return to its steady state, where the regime is always that of a zero reaction to stock price changes.
ﬁgure shows the impulse response of the asset price in the model without asymmetric policy. We ﬁrst assume that the turning points under this policy
hanged when the asymmetric policy is introduced. We then later verify that this is in fact the case.
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t 6 T1, when the policy reaction to asset prices is again zero, we can similarly compute the value of st in each period recur-
sively as a function of s1. From (A22), we get the following expression, which is needed to describe the last period before this
ﬁrst shift:Please
econosT1þ1 ¼ CT2T1 sT1 : ðA24Þ
Performing recursive operations in a similar fashion to above provides us with the following expression for st:st ¼ HT1tþ1st1;2 6 t 6 T1; ðA25Þ
where, for each t;HT1tþ1 ¼ I  bAHT1t 1bC ;
and where bA ¼  B
 1A; bC ¼  B
 1C; and:H1   ACT2T1 þ B
 1
C:Finally, the special case where t ¼ 1 is the only time at which the shocks take on non-zero values. We use (A15) and (A25)
as well as the assumption that the economy starts out in steady state in period 0, implying that s0 ¼ 0. We then obtain an
expression for s1 as a function of the time 1-innovations:0 ¼ As2 þ Bs1 þ Cs0 þ De1 ()
s1 ¼ I  bAHT11 1 bDe1; ðA26Þ
where bD ¼  B
 1D. Finally, we obtain:st ¼
Yt1
i¼1
HT1i
 !
I  bAHT11 1 bDe1;2 6 t 6 T1: ðA27ÞAs mentioned in the main text, the model is solved in practice by making use of a shooting algorithm to ﬁnd the turning
points. An initial guess for each of the turning points is needed. Given the initial guess, we solve for st ;8t. It is then easy to
verify whether this initial guess was correct or not by simply checking whether the sign of Dqt actually does shift for
t ¼ Tinitialguess. If this is the case, we keep the solution. If not, we adjust our initial guess, and we ‘shoot’ again, until the con-
dition is satisﬁed.
Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.jmacro.2013.11.002.
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